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A LITTLE MORE CONTRACT LAW
WITH MY CONTRACTS PLEASE: THE NEED TO
APPLY UNCONSCIONABILITY DIRECTLY TO
CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES
Jillian R. Camarote ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Large companies have the power to craft agreements and transactions in their favor through the use of form contracts, often called
contracts of adhesion. With the rise of the doctrine of unconscion1
ability, courts began to strike shockingly unfair terms out of form
contracts. Large companies, however, can avoid this result by using
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses. One of the distinguishing
features of our federalist system of government is that states are free
to adopt and apply their own laws so long as those laws do not inter2
fere with federal law. One drawback to this system is that it creates
an incentive for pre-dispute forum shopping. This is especially problematic in the context of consumer contracts, since the company can
invoke the favorable law of any chosen state by injecting a choice-oflaw or forum selection clause into an adhesion contract. This practice could bind the party with less bargaining power to the law of a
state with which they have no connection, and more importantly, the
3
law of the chosen state could bar all of the party’s claims. Although
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1
See infra Part II.D.
2
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 3–4 (3d ed.
2006).
3
See, e.g., Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash.
June 25, 2004) (plaintiff’s claims were barred because the court upheld the choiceof-law clause, and the chosen state’s law allowed class-action waivers embedded within arbitration clauses); Nexen Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g Co., 224 S.W.3d 412, 417
(Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (plaintiff’s claims barred because application of Alberta law
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one of the primary purposes of adopting a conflict of laws regime was
4
to curb pre-dispute forum shopping, the current conflicts system actually encourages forum shopping by giving great deference to the
5
parties’ contractual choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clauses.
The egregiously unfair effects of the current system are felt most
6
by consumers, individuals, and small businesses, who are generally
the weaker party to the adhesion contract and have little or no bargaining power. While there is some very limited statutory protection
7
for consumers, the current way of analyzing choice-of-law and forum
selection clauses is deficient. The most common way courts analyze
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses is by the approach set forth
in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which assumes the
8
validity of the clause as a matter of contract law. Courts spend little,
if any, time on determining whether the clause in and of itself is valid
outside of the conflict of laws analysis.
The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws did not give much
9
deference to the parties’ choice of law or choice of forum, but the
Restatement (Second) formally adopted the “party autonomy” doc10
trine. Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) states generally that
“[t]he law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contrac11
tual rights and duties will be applied . . . .” A court should only invalidate a choice-of-law clause if the clause has “no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction” and there is “no other
12
reasonable basis for the parties’ choice,” or application of the chosen law would be “contrary to a fundamental policy of [the forum]
contained a statute of repose that would not have been applicable in an American
court).
4
Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV.
553, 559 (1989).
5
The practice of giving deference to the parties’ contractual choice-of-law or forum selection clause is known as the party autonomy doctrine, discussed infra Part
II.B.
6
See William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and
Those It Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 64 (2006).
7
See U.C.C. § 1-301 (2003) (giving a very narrowly defined class of consumers
some protection from choice-of-law clauses). But see Woodward, supra note 6, at 65–
66 (stating that “consumer” is under-inclusive and that only one state has enacted
legislation restricting choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses as used against consumers).
8
See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
9
Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close
of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 571, 575 (1999).
10
Id. at 576.
11
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971).
12
Id. § 187(2)(a).
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state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state.”
In addition, the forum state’s law must be the law that would be ap14
plicable absent the choice-of-law clause. The “substantial relationship” test is easily met and does not pose any real threat to the par15
ties’ choice-of-law decision. Therefore, to invalidate the clause, the
forum court must find four things: (1) the chosen law has neither a
“substantial relationship” to the parties nor some other reasonable
basis; (2) application of the choice-of-law clause would be in contravention to the forum state’s fundamental policy; (3) the forum state’s
fundamental policy is materially greater than the policy of the state
chosen; and (4) the forum state’s law would govern absent the choice
16
by the parties. These obstacles make it extremely difficult to invalidate a choice-of-law or forum selection clause.
Another major problem with the current conflicts analysis is that
courts often presume that a valid contract exists when applying these
17
conflict of laws principles. Courts thus gloss over the important initial question of whether the terms of the contract constitute a valid
18
enforceable agreement.
This Comment describes and analyzes the effect of the current
system on the weaker party to adhesion contracts. First, this Comment describes the historical background to the problem, briefly addressing the emergence of the current American conflict of laws system, the rise of party autonomy and its relationship with pre-dispute
forum shopping, and the contemporaneous rise of the doctrine of
unconscionability. In Part II, this Comment describes the current
method courts use when analyzing the validity of choice-of-law clauses. Finally, in Part III, this Comment analyzes the proper application
of section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, using
both case law and scholarly interpretation, and concludes that because of the deficiency of section 187, a new analysis should be used.
Specifically, this Comment proposes a new Restatement provision requiring courts to initially examine the choice-of-law or forum selection clause as a contractual matter, using the doctrine of unconscionability, to determine in the first instance if the clause is enforceable
before embarking on the complicated conflicts analysis. This Comment notes that the forum court should apply its own law to this anal13
14
15
16
17
18

Id. § 187(2)(b).
Id.
Woodward, supra note 6, at 27.
Id. at 25–26.
See id. at 16–17.
See id.
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ysis, but it only has the power to do so if the forum bears a “substantial relationship” to the parties or the transaction. This proposition
will better protect consumers, individuals, and small business owners,
while limiting the power of large companies to engage in detrimental
pre-dispute forum shopping.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. Emergence of the Current American Conflict of Laws Doctrine
Prior to the emergence of the current American conflict of laws
doctrine, the law governing contract disputes was simply the law of
19
the jurisdiction where the parties brought the suit. Because courts
were willing to apply the law of their own forum, parties could choose
to file in a jurisdiction whose law was favorable to them. Scholars argued that a conflict of laws regime was necessary to guard against this
rampant pre-dispute forum shopping, and indeed, the “very purpose
of the classical conflicts system was the prevention of forum shop20
ping.” In order to avoid this problem, courts would need to apply
the same substantive law after applying the applicable rule from the
21
conflicts doctrine.
Conflict of laws rules are not a form of transcendent international or interstate rules, and therefore they are primarily exercised
22
through state law. Conflict of laws issues arise both when there is a
conflict between an American law and a foreign law in international
transactions and when states within the United States have conflicting
23
laws. Because states have the power to adopt the rules that they like
and ignore those they disfavor, there is no uniformity in the conflict
rules adopted, and the goal of preventing forum shopping is
24
thwarted. In addition, “there is no mechanism of superior authority
for the resolution of ‘conflicts;’ instead, the accommodation of conflicting reasons for the application of local or foreign law . . . must be
worked out and provided by the forum itself according to its own view
25
of conflict of laws.”

19

William J. Woodward, Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 8 (2006).
20
Juenger, supra note 4, at 559.
21
Woodward, supra note 19, at 8.
22
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1–2 (2d ed. 1992).
23
Id. at 2.
24
Woodward, supra note 19, at 8–9.
25
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 2.

CAMAROTE (FINAL)

2009]

4/6/2009 11:20:05 PM

COMMENT

609

B. Emergence of the Party Autonomy Doctrine
Courts generally enforced choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
clauses as early as the nineteenth century, due to basic contract principles that allowed parties to bargain freely for their terms, so long as
26
public policy was not violated. In addition, many courts recognized
ideas of comity, by which one court would be courteous to a sister
state (domestic or international) by applying the law of that sister
27
state. With the emergence of the conflict of laws doctrine came the
doctrine of party autonomy, which places emphasis on the power of
“contracting parties [to] choose the substantive law to be applied by
[the court] deciding the parties’ rights and duties under the contract
28
and resolving disputes between the parties.” This doctrine is closely
tied to the contractual notion that because contracts are entered into
29
deliberately, the parties’ expectations should be upheld. “[B]y giving effect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law (party autonomy),” not only are the parties’ expectations upheld, but predict30
ability is served as well. Despite the courts’ willingness to embrace
the party autonomy doctrine, many scholars were initially (and some
31
continue to be) hostile to the idea. For example, Joseph Beale, the
chief architect of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, rejected
the idea of party autonomy because he believed that the law regarding contract disputes was not for private citizens to decide, as it was
32
the province of state sovereignty.
Not surprisingly, the first Re33
statement did not recognize party autonomy. In 1952, the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) recognized party autonomy by stating
that “[w]henever a . . . transaction bears a reasonable relationship to
one or more states or nations in addition to this state the parties may
agree that the law of any such state or nation shall govern their rights
34
and duties.”

26

Reimann, supra note 9, at 575.
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 11–12.
28
Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The Failure of Revised
U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 59, 60 (2005).
29
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 657.
30
Id.
31
Reimann, supra note 9, at 575.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
U.C.C. § 1-105(6) (1952).
27
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Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws

The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws followed suit in 1971 with the enactment of section 187, which acknowledges and arguably embraces party autonomy. Section 187(1) declares that “[t]he law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is
one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in
35
their agreement directed to that issue.” Section 187(2) limits the
general acceptance of the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable
law by stating that even if the parties could not have resolved the issue
by an explicit provision, the clause will be upheld unless either (a)
the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’
choice or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular
issue and which, under the rule of section 188, would be the state of
the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
36
37
parties. A majority of the states have adopted section 187.
In theory, section 187(2)(a) can protect weaker parties who presumably signed an adhesion contract by requiring that the choice-oflaw or choice-of-forum clause has a “substantial relationship” to the
parties or a reasonable basis for the parties’ choice. Courts have generally interpreted “substantial relationship” as including any state to
which either of the parties (or the transaction) has a substantial rela38
Stated differtionship, including the drafter’s home jurisdiction.
ently, “the parties may select the law of the state which is the domicile
of one of them [or] either the place of formation or of perform39
Although courts generally refused to characterize a comance.”
pany’s place of incorporation as its “domicile” for these purposes
40
prior to the enactment of the Restatement (Second), the trend toward party autonomy after the Restatement (Second) seems to sug-

35

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971).
Id. § 187(2).
37
See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1260 & n.96 (1997).
38
Woodward, supra note 6, at 27.
39
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 671.
40
Id. at 672 (stating that the “state of incorporation is usually considered to have
too indirect a connection with the transaction to support the choice of its law”).
36
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41

gest otherwise. In fact, California courts have stated outright that
the place of incorporation is “sufficient to support a finding of ‘sub42
stantial relationship.’”
Allowing a corporation to meet the “substantial relationship” test
by picking its place of incorporation can have the effect of binding
the weaker party to the laws of a state that the weaker party may never
43
have contemplated governing the transaction.
A weaker party is
likely on notice that there may be a “substantial relationship” to the
state of formation or the state of performance. Under the current
analysis, however, if the stronger party is a corporation, the weaker
party may be bound to the law of the company’s state of incorporation, and most likely the weaker party is not on notice that the state of
incorporation could constitute a “substantial relationship.” Still, some
critics of limitations on party autonomy argue that the “substantial relationship” requirement is overbroad because the public policy limi44
45
tation alone is sufficient to protect the parties. In response to this
argument, scholars have pointed out that the public policy limitation
applies only to “fundamental” policies and would thus alleviate less
abuse than the “substantial relationship” requirement, which is easily
46
met anyway.
The forum state also retains the right to override the parties’
choice-of-law or forum selection clause if the fundamental policy of
47
the forum is violated. However, for this to be rightfully exercised,
the forum state must have a “materially greater interest” than the
state chosen by the parties and must be the state whose law would ap48
ply absent the clause in the contract.
In light of section 187(2)(a) and (b), which purportedly limit
the broad acceptance of party autonomy, it is not hard for the
stronger party to meet the “substantial relationship” test. The “materially greater interest” requirement and the requirement that the forum state’s law must apply absent the choice-of-law clause, however,
41

Woodward, supra note 6, at 27 (stating that the corporation’s home jurisdiction
will “obviously overcome a challenge under the substantial relationship test because
one of the contracting parties is located or incorporated in the selected state”).
42
See Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 84 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998).
43
See id.
44
The fundamental public policy limitation is part of the third prong of the analysis. See infra notes 158–63and accompanying text.
45
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 670.
46
Id.
47
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
48
Id.
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are hard to meet. Therefore, the effect of section 187 is a sweeping
endorsement of the party autonomy principle.
Comment b to section 187 states that a choice-of-law provision
will not be enforced if it
was obtained by improper means, such as by misrepresentation,
duress, or undue influence, or by mistake . . . . A factor which the
forum may consider is whether the choice-of-law provision is contained in an “adhesion” contract, namely one that is drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a “take-itor-leave-it” basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity
49
to bargain about its terms.

Comment b illustrates the drafters’ intent to consider basic contract
principles, specifically whether an agreement existed in the first
place, when determining if a choice-of-law clause is enforceable. Further, it is likely that the “factor which the forum may consider” is unconscionability, but the drafters curiously declined to specifically use
that language. By leaving out unconscionability, comment b does not
name all the contract law devices for analyzing the validity of an
agreement. Comment b is therefore insufficient in drawing courts’
attention to the initial question of whether a valid contract exists.
Not surprisingly, no court has stricken a choice-of-law clause by claim50
ing that it is unconscionable pursuant to comment b.
When a party challenges a choice-of-law clause, in order to correctly apply section 187, the court must also understand and apply
51
section 188. Section 188 generally addresses which law governs the
contract in dispute in absence of the parties’ chosen law. Section
188(1) says that the state which “has the most significant relationship
to the transaction and the parties” is the state whose law will govern
52
the contract. Subsection 2 of section 188 lists certain factors to de53
termine which state has the “most significant relationship.”

49

Id. § 187 cmt. b.
Woodward, supra note 6, at 54. Professor Woodward argues that if courts
threw out the choice-of-law clause on an initial contract challenge then the conflict
of laws analysis would not be necessary. Id. This implies that section 187 would not
have been implicated in the first place because it is a conflicts of law principle. Id.
This argument further supports the theory that courts assume that a valid contract
exists for purposes of section 187. Id.
51
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
52
Id. § 188.
53
Id. § 188(2) (listing the factors to include “(a) the place of contracting, (b) the
place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location
of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties”).
50
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Going even further than the Restatement (Second), the current
U.C.C. provision addressing party autonomy requires only a “reasonable relation” to the state chosen by the parties if the clause is in a
54
consumer contract. The obvious purpose behind this revision is to
expand the use of choice-of-law clauses, yet as of 2005 each of the
twenty-one states considering adopting the new revised Article 1 of
the U.C.C. refused to adopt the expanded party autonomy provision
55
in its proposed form. Even though it seems that states are initially
hesitant to further expand party autonomy, U.C.C. section 1-301 evidences scholars’ preference for such an expansion.
2.

Party Autonomy and Forum Shopping

Although some scholars believe that the purpose of creating a
56
conflict of laws regime was to prevent pre-dispute forum shopping,
others believe that fostering competition among the states is the best
57
way to ensure an efficient legal system. Larry Ribstein states that
[p]ermitting contracting parties to choose their governing law
gives states an incentive to compete for law business by providing
efficient legal rules. Competition works both by encouraging
states to develop new terms to attract new legal business, and by
encouraging states to retain legal business by efficiently revising
58
their laws.

While Professor Ribstein’s economic-laden theory makes sense in
59
some situations, it fails as a general rule because it does not afford
weaker parties to contracts the proper protection. Further, Professor
Ribstein argues that section 187 affords the parties to a contract too
60
much protection, in contravention of the party autonomy doctrine.

54

U.C.C. § 1-301 (2004). Section 1-301(c) states generally that “an agreement by
parties to a domestic transaction that any or all of their rights and obligations are to
be determined by the law of this State or of another State is effective, whether or not
the transaction bears a relation to the State designated.” Id. § 1-301(c). However,
section 1-301(e) states that “[i]f one of the parties to a transaction is a consumer . . .
[a]n agreement referred to in subsection (c) is not effective unless the transaction
bears a reasonable relation to the State or country designated.” Id. § 1-301(e).
55
Graves, supra note 28, at 59, 67.
56
Juenger, supra note 4, at 559.
57
See Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 249–55
(1993).
58
Id. at 249–50.
59
For example, Professor Ribstein’s theory makes sense when the parties to the
contract were of equal bargaining power at the time the contract was formed.
60
Erin O’Hara & Larry Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law 38–39
(George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 00-04, 2000),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=199849.
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This Comment, however, shows the egregious effects of section 187
61
and why it does not afford enough protection.
The party autonomy doctrine is widely embraced in Europe as
62
well. The conflict of laws rules that govern European conflicts of
contractual choices of law were developed at the Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, better known as the
63
Although the Rome Convention largely en“Rome Convention.”
dorses the notion of party autonomy in Article 3, thus giving much
deference to the parties’ choice of law to govern the contract, there
64
In particular, Article 5 specifically
are some built-in protections.
addresses consumer contracts:
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a choice of
law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the
mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has
his habitual residence:
— if in that country the conclusion of the contract was
preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in that country all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract, or
— if the other party or his agent received the consumer’s
order in that country, or
— if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from that country to another country and
there gave his order, provided that the consumer’s journey
was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the
consumer to buy.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract to
which this Article applies shall, in the absence of choice in
accordance with Article 3, be governed by the law of the
country in which the consumer has his habitual residence if
it is entered into in the circumstances described in para65
graph 2 of this Article.
While some states have adopted legislation protecting consumers in
66
the United States, the Rome Convention is superior in its protection

61

See infra Part II.E.
See Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations art. 3,
June 19, 1980, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1492 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at art. 5.
66
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1751 (West 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3511
(2007); N.J. STAT. ANN § 56:12 (West 2007).
62

CAMAROTE (FINAL)

2009]

4/6/2009 11:20:05 PM

COMMENT

615

of consumers because the very document that allows party autonomy
67
also restricts it to avoid unfair results to consumers.
Although the notion of party autonomy gives great deference to
the choice of the parties involved, it seems hostile to the doctrine of
unconscionability because unconscionability calls for greater scrutiny
of certain terms of a contract and for the striking down of contracts
68
that shock the conscience. Courts seem to favor the party autonomy
69
doctrine but do not seem as comfortable using unconscionability to
70
police parties’ choices.
C. Forum Selection Clauses
Section 80 of the Restatement (Second) governs the parties’
71
right to choose a forum in a contract. Section 80 states that “[t]he
parties’ agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of
judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect unless
72
it is unfair or unreasonable.” The “unfair or unreasonable” test is
extremely flexible, and the analysis for whether the forum selection
clause is binding as a matter of contract law is rather circular because
“courts assume that customers freely contract for a particular forum
and then use that assumption to add makeweight to the conclusion
73
that the choice of forum provision is not ‘unfair or unreasonable.’”
In light of the Supreme Court of the United States upholding a
seemingly unconscionable forum selection clause in Carnival Cruise
74
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, there has been much criticism of the party au75
tonomy doctrine as applied to forum selection clauses. In Shute, the
Supreme Court upheld a choice-of-forum clause on a Carnival Cruise
76
Line ticket. The clause required the plaintiff to bring her personal
injury claim in Florida where the offices of Carnival Cruise Lines were
located, despite the fact that the plaintiff lived in California, which

67

Rome Convention, supra note 62, at art. 5.
See infra Part II.D.
69
See Symeonides, supra note 37, at 1260.
70
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 302 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that “[o]n the
whole, judges have been cautious in applying the doctrine of unconscionability, recognizing that the parties often must make their contract quickly, that their bargaining power will rarely be equal, and that courts are ill-equipped to deal with problems
of unequal distribution of wealth in society”).
71
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971).
72
Id.
73
Woodward, supra note 6, at 35.
74
499 U.S. 585 (1991).
75
See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 6, at 33–34.
76
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595.
68
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77

was also where the cruise took place. Although the plaintiff in Shute
argued that the provision was “unfair or unreasonable,” the Court was
78
79
not persuaded. While Shute was technically an admiralty case, it
evidences a general endorsement of deference by the Supreme Court
to contractually selected forums.
80
In America Online v. Booker, a Florida court applied Shute to
achieve what some claim is an even harsher outcome than Shute it81
self. There, the court’s enforcement of the choice-of-forum clause
effectively destroyed the plaintiff’s claim because Virginia, the chosen
82
forum, had no class-action procedure. The suit would likely be a
83
“negative value suit” without class certification, so the claims were in
84
effect barred. The court found that the plaintiff’s claims did not
meet the standard of showing that the forum selection clause was
85
“unreasonable or unjust.” If the trend set by Shute and Booker continues, the Second Restatement’s purported protection of disallowing
choice-of-forum clauses that are “unfair or unreasonable” is essentially useless.
D. Emergence of the Doctrine of Unconscionability
In 1941, the American Law Institute circulated a draft of the
U.C.C. that contained the precursor to section 2-302, expressly rec86
ognizing the equitable doctrine of unconscionability. The final version of the first U.C.C. contained the following language:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,

77

Id.
Id. at 588–89, 595.
79
Woodward, supra note 19, at 16 (noting that “[i]t is reasonably clear that because Carnival Cruise Lines was an admiralty case, its analysis need not be adopted by
state courts deciding whether they should dismiss a case where an adhesion contract
specifies a different exclusive forum”).
80
781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
81
Woodward, supra note 6, at 34.
82
America Online, 781 So. 2d at 424.
83
See In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that a “‘negative value’ suit is one in which class members’ claims ‘would be uneconomical to litigate individually’” (quoting Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 809 (1985))).
84
America Online, 781 So. 2d at 424–25.
85
Id. at 425.
86
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 489 (1967).
78
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or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
87
to avoid any unconscionable result.

This section has remained largely unchanged, except that the word
88
“term” now replaces the word “clause.” Comment one to the current version states that “[t]his section makes it possible for a court to
police explicitly against the contracts or terms which the court finds
to be unconscionable instead of attempting to achieve the result by
an adverse construction of language . . . or by a determination that
89
the term is contrary to public policy . . . .” This language contradicts
section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws because it challenges courts to find terms unconscionable in and of
themselves without looking to contravention of public policy, as sec90
tion 187 requires, to invalidate a choice-of-law clause.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts followed suit by enacting section 208, which contains similar language to the U.C.C. provision. Section 208 states:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the
contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any uncon91
scionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.

Despite such broad language, courts generally require a showing that
the clause or term is both procedurally and substantively unconscion92
able.
To determine whether the procedural unconscionability
prong has been met, courts look to such factors as “bargaining practices . . . the use of fine print and convoluted language . . . [and] a
93
Substantive unconscionability is found
lack of understanding.”
when the contract contains “unreasonably favorable terms” for one of
the parties, focusing on the content of the contract, not the bargain94
ing process by which it was reached. However, courts commonly
view these requirements as a “sliding scale,” meaning that if “more of
95
one is present then less of the other is required.”
87

U.C.C. § 2-302 (1952).
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2003).
89
Id. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003).
90
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
91
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
92
FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 301.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 302; see also Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280–82 (9th
Cir. 2006) (describing California’s unconscionability doctrine, which uses a sliding
scale analysis).
88
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E. Current State of Courts’ Application of Section 187
1.

Confusion Applying Section 187

Although a majority of the states have adopted section 187 of the
96
Restatement (Second), some courts seem to be confused about its
97
application. In Nedlloyd Lines B.C. v. Superior Court, the Supreme
Court of California described its process for determining whether a
98
choice-of-law clause should be applied under a section 187 analysis.
Nedlloyd involved a shipping company incorporated in Hong Kong
that contracted with other shipping companies incorporated in the
99
Netherlands. The defendant companies had their principal places
of business in the Netherlands, while the plaintiff company had its
100
principal place of business in California.
The court ultimately
found that the choice-of-law clause—calling for application of Hong
Kong law—was enforceable because Hong Kong had a “substantial
101
connection with the parties.” In reaching this conclusion, the court
102
explained the section 187 test that California courts should use. Af103
the court articulated what it
ter directly quoting section 187,
thought to be the proper application of section 187(2):
The court [must] first . . . determine either: (1) whether the chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their
transaction, or (2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for
the parties’ choice of law. If neither of these tests is met, that is
the end of the inquiry, and the court need not enforce the parties’ choice of law. If, however, either test is met, the court must
next determine whether the chosen state’s law is contrary to a
fundamental policy of California. If there is no such conflict, the
court shall enforce the parties’ choice of law. If, however, there is
a fundamental conflict with California law, the court must then
determine whether California has a “materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue
. . . .” If California has a materially greater interest than the chosen state, the choice of law shall not be enforced, for the obvious

96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Symeonides, supra note 37, at 1260 & n.96.
834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992).
Id. at 1151–52.
Id. at 1149–50.
Id. at 1149.
Id.
Id. at 1151–52.
Nedlloyd Lines B.C., 834 P.2d. at 1151.
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reason that in such circumstance we will decline to enforce a law
104
contrary to this state’s fundamental policy.

This explanation, however, deviated from the plain language of section 187. The Supreme Court of California’s interpretation is inherently flawed because it fails to recognize one of the explicit requirements of section 187: section 187 clearly indicates that a court can
only invalidate a choice-of-law provision and apply its own law—due
to contravention of the forum state’s fundamental policy—if the forum state “would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an
105
effective choice of law by the parties.”
In Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., a California appeals court applied the test set forth in Nedlloyd to determine whether
106
There, a California
the parties’ choice-of-law clause was binding.
corporation hired an employee who had previously signed a contract
containing a covenant not to compete and a Maryland choice-of-law
107
Alclause with a Maryland corporation, her previous employer.
though the court found other reasons for not enforcing the covenant
108
not to compete, much of the analysis relied on California’s applica109
The
tion of section 187 to the conflict of laws question at hand.
court concluded that although Maryland bears a “substantial relationship” to the parties, and there clearly is a “reasonable basis” for the
parties choosing Maryland law as the applicable law, the fundamental
policy of California requires a court to render non-compete clauses
110
void.
The court then noted that the laws of California and Mary111
land are “diametrically opposed” regarding non-compete clauses,
but nonetheless found that California’s interest was materially great112
er.
Completely lacking in this analysis, however, is any mention of
113
whose law would apply absent the choice-of-law clause.

104

Id. at 1152 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971) (emphasis
added).
106
Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 82–88 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998).
107
Id. at 76–77.
108
See id. at 81 (noting that the covenant not to compete was limited to one year,
and because that year had passed, the argument for enforcement was essentially
moot).
109
Id. at 82–83 (citing Nedlloyd Lines B.C., 834 P.2d at 1150–52) (relying heavily on
Nedlloyd and quoting significant portions of that decision).
110
Id. at 84–86.
111
Id.
112
Application Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
113
See id. at 84–86.
105

CAMAROTE (FINAL)

620

4/6/2009 11:20:05 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:605

New Jersey is seemingly joining California’s approach by placing
much importance on the contravention of its fundamental policy but
not determining whether New Jersey law would apply absent the parties’ choice-of-law clause. For example, in North Bergen Rex Transport,
Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., the Supreme Court of New Jersey applied
New Jersey law to a dispute regarding attorneys’ fees, despite the par114
ties’ specification that Illinois law would govern the contract.
The
court did not discuss whether New Jersey law would have applied in
115
the absence of the choice-of-law clause.
2.

Egregiously Unfair Results

Despite misapplication of section 187, which clearly shows that
some of the protections envisioned by the drafters are essentially
116
moot, a more extreme problem occurs when courts faithfully apply
section 187 but reach an egregiously unfair result. In Scheifley v. Discover Bank, a federal court in Washington upheld a choice-of-law
117
Plaintiff Scheifley
clause specifying Delaware’s law as controlling.
sought to bring the suit as a class-action against the bank for violating
118
The contract included an arbitrathe Fair Credit Reporting Act.
tion clause and a class-action waiver, and Scheifley claimed that the
arbitration clause was unconscionable due to the embedded class119
However, the court found the choice-of-law clause
action waiver.
120
binding, which effectively “decided the entire case.”
Class-action waivers in Delaware do not render arbitration clauses unconscionable, but Washington precedent dictated that arbitration clauses embedded in class-action waivers would be unconscion121
Scheifley was effectively barred from bringing a class-action
able.
suit against the bank, and because the suit is likely considered a “negative value suit,” she may never get relief. An individual plaintiff is
114

N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 730 A.2d 843, 847–48 (N.J.
1999).
115
See id.
116
Presumably, the drafters of section 187 thought that by requiring a forum to
find that its own law would only apply “in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties,” the drafters were stopping courts from applying their own law on the
mere basis that the forum has a “materially greater interest” than the chosen state.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b).
117
Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. June 25,
2004); see also Woodward, supra note 6, at 28–29 (discussing Scheifley in depth).
118
Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. June 25,
2004).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
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likely to forego the right to arbitrate if it would cost more to do so
than the plaintiff would receive in damages, especially if the arbitration must take place in a state to which the plaintiff would have to
travel.
More recently in a factually similar circumstance, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a Virginia
122
choice-of-law clause in a consumer contract in Gay v. CreditInform.
The contract included both an arbitration clause and a class action
123
waiver, which under Virginia law are valid within arbitration.
The
court refused to find the arbitration clause itself unconscionable under the Federal Arbitration Act, and therefore the plaintiff was
124
barred from bringing a class-action. If it will cost the plaintiff more
to litigate the case than she will recover, then she will not bring the
suit and will not get relief.
Another example of a seemingly unfair result from upholding a
125
In
choice-of-law clause is Nexen Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Engineering Co.
126
1991, Gulf Interstate Engineering Co. (GIE) agreed by contract to
127
contribute certain engineering services to Nexen Inc. for a project
128
When flooding caused damage to a pipeline at the proin Yemen.
ject site, Nexen sued GIE for “breach of contract, breach of warranty,
129
negligence, and strict liability for design defect.”
GIE moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the contract contained an Alberta,
130
Canada choice-of-law clause.
Under Alberta law, the ten-year statute of repose would bar any claims because the date of completion
131
The court recognized that application of Texas law
was 1993.
would allow the plaintiffs to still bring claims because the Texas statute of limitations only applied to specific parties and has a different
132
However, the court applied Alberta
accrual date than Alberta law.
122

511 F.3d 369, 390 (3d Cir. 2007).
See id. at 391–92.
124
See id. at 394.
125
224 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
126
The contract was also amended in 1992, to extend the time period for the performance of the contract. Id. at 414.
127
The original party to the contract was Nexen’s corporate predecessor, CanadianOxy Offshore International Ltd., but the contracting party at issue will be referred to as Nexen. Id. at 414–15.
128
Id. at 414.
129
Id. at 415.
130
Id. at 415–16 (stating that generally applicable Alberta law imposes a statute of
repose that starts accruing from the date of completion of the contract; the law applies regardless of subsequent events, and regardless of the party bringing the claim).
131
Nexen Inc., 224 S.W.3d at 415–16.
132
Id. at 419–22.
123
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law, thus dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims and effectively denying them
133
The court heavily relied on a central tenet of contract
any relief.
law, stating that “[t]he most basic policy of contract law is the protec134
tion of the justified expectations of the parties.”
III. ANALYSIS
The conflict of laws analysis has come to embrace the idea of
party autonomy, thus giving deference to certain contract princi135
ples.
By giving so much deference to the law the parties choose,
however, the original goal of the conflicts regime, namely, to have a
136
uniform law and to avoid pre-dispute forum shopping, is thwarted.
Courts generally allow the parties (or, in a contract of adhesion, the
137
stronger party) to choose a law that is most favorable.
It seems,
however, that courts are likely to presume that a valid contract existed
in the first place and to take up a section 187 analysis without first ex138
This is most likely due to secamining basic contracts questions.
139
tion 187’s assumption of contractual validity.
A. Using a Three-Step Analysis
To sort through some of the confusion that courts have encountered in applying section 187, some scholars have suggested that
140
courts embark on a three-step process.
1.

Whose Contract Law Applies?

First, “the forum court faces an initial conflict of laws question of
which state’s contract law governs the choice-of-law or choice-of141
forum provision in the contract.”
As Professor Woodward notes,
this “initial question of which state’s contract law should be applied
to determine whether the underlying contract is enforceable . . . is
142
scarcely addressed anywhere.” In the first half of the twentieth century, courts generally used the contract law of the state where the
contract was made for construction and interpretation of the con133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 419–22, 426.
Id. at 419 (internal citations omitted).
See Graves, supra note 28, at 60.
Juenger, supra note 4, at 559.
See supra notes 117–34and accompanying text.
Woodward, supra note 6, at 17.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted).
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143

tract, called the “vested rights” theory. This was the position of the
144
The “vested rights” approach lasted until the
Restatement (First).
145
The “conflicts revolution” shifted emphasis
“conflicts revolution.”
toward state interests and policies when states began to give more de146
ference to the choice of the parties. In the latter half of the twentieth century, some courts began to use the “most significant relationship” test, which used factors to balance state interests and policies to
determine which jurisdiction had the most relevant connection to the
147
This is the approach adopted by the Restatement (Seccontract.
148
ond). Courts have not universally adopted this approach, however,
and a circuit split exists regarding whether the contract law of the fo149
rum or the parties’ chosen state should apply.
Comment b to section 187 briefly addresses this issue by stating
that a contract “obtained by improper means, such as by misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence, or by mistake” is not enforceable,
and that the existence of such improper means shall be “determined
150
Howby the forum in accordance with its own legal principles.”
ever, this contradicts the general approach of the Restatement (Second) because section 188 “directs a forum court to use the contract
law of the jurisdiction with the ‘most significant relationship’ in de151
ciding most contract law questions.”
Known as the “center of gravity” approach, this method limits the parties’ power to choose the applicable contract law, because the forum court would be forced to
apply the law of the forum with the “most significant relationship” to
152
Although Professor Woodward arthe parties or the transaction.
gues that applying section 188 better avoids forum shopping than

143

Reimann, supra note 9, at 579.
Id.
145
Id. at 584.
146
See id.
147
Id. at 579–81.
148
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
149
Compare Heating & Air Specialists, Inc. v. Jones, 180 F.3d 923, 930–31 (8th Cir.
1999) (holding that the law of the state chosen by the parties would apply to contract
construction only because the clause specifically denoted that the law “shall
govern . . . interpretation,” but otherwise, the forum is free to use its own law where
there is a significant relationship), with Kipin Indus., Inc. v. Van Deilen Int’l, Inc.,
182 F.3d 490, 493–94 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that proper application of section
187 requires a court to apply the chosen law to contract interpretation).
150
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971).
151
Woodward, supra note 6, at 19.
152
Id.
144
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153

does comment b to section 187, allowing a forum court to apply its
own contract law will help avoid any unfair pre-dispute forum shopping.
2.

Is the Provision Binding as a Matter of Contract Law?

After determining whose contract law should apply, the second
step in the analysis is to apply “that contract law to the choice of law
or forum clause to determine whether the provision is binding on the
154
parties as a matter of contract law.” Courts applying section 187 do
not seem to analyze this portion of the inquiry thoroughly, if at all,
because they spend most of their time discussing and applying the
155
In addition, it seems that the contracts
third step of the analysis.
questions that courts do consider (misrepresentation, duress, undue
156
influence, and mistake) are applicable mainly to the contract as a
whole, and not to the choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause. If this
initial contracts determination more specifically asked whether the
contract and all of its specific terms/clauses were enforceable, it might
force courts to look more specifically at the choice-of-law or choice-offorum clause and apply a doctrine such as unconscionability, which
can be used to invalidate the contract as a whole or any of its individ157
It would be more equitable and practical if
ual terms or clauses.
courts looked more carefully at the validity of the clauses and terms
in the first step by analyzing choice-of-law and forum selection clauses
under the rubric of unconscionability, instead of going through the
complicated analysis that the third step requires.
3.

Should the Forum Court Recognize the Choice-of-Law
or Forum Selection Clause?

Once the court determines that the choice-of-law or choice-offorum provision in question is binding as a matter of contract law, the
court moves to the third step and asks “whether the forum court
153

Id. (stating that “[c]omment b to [s]ection 187 is curious because applying the
law of the forum state to a threshold contract question opens the potential for forum
shopping”).
154
Id. at 17.
155
Id. at 21.
156
These are the doctrines listed in comment b to section 187. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971).
157
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003) (stating that if the court “finds the contract or any
term of the contract to have been unconscionable . . . the court may refuse to enforce
[it]” (emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (stating
that if “a contract or term thereof is unconscionable . . . a court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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should recognize the contractual choice of law or choice of forum
the parties collectively made or whether the forum state’s policies
should override the parties’ agreement to the choice of law or fo158
159
rum.” This step dominates the section 187 analysis. At this stage,
the court must determine (1) whether the chosen law has either a
“substantial relationship” to the parties, or some other reasonable ba160
sis, (2) whether application of the choice-of-law clause would be in
161
contravention of the forum state’s fundamental policy, (3) whether
the forum state’s fundamental policy is materially greater than the
162
policy of the state chosen, and (4) whether the forum state’s law
163
would govern absent the choice by the parties.
B. Section 187(2)(b) Is Insufficient as It Currently Stands
Courts are able to give some deference to the parties’ intentions
by allowing only the forum court to invalidate a choice-of-law clause
(assuming that it first legitimately passes the initial contracts ques164
tion) if the effect is to violate a fundamental policy of that forum.
However, the additional requirements imposed by section 187—that
the forum’s fundamental policy must be “materially greater” than the
choice of the parties and that the forum’s law would apply absent the
choice-of-law clause—put an almost impossible burden on the plain165
tiff when both are applied properly. As previously discussed, some
states have stopped applying the provision requiring that the forum’s
law would apply absent the parties’ choice. This illustrates an attempt
by those courts to give relief to a party whose claims might otherwise
be barred; however, to reach this result, those courts find it necessary
166
Further, by getting past
to ignore the “absence choice” provision.
the first portion of section 187, which requires that the choice of law
have a “substantial relationship” (or other reasonable basis) to the
167
transaction or parties, the plaintiff carries a substantial burden to
158

Woodward, supra note 6, at 17.
Id. at 21.
160
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).
161
Id. § 187(2)(b).
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 657 (stating that “predictability in choice-oflaw decisions is an important value in contracts. Such predictability is served, and
party expectations are protected, by giving effect to the parties’ own choice of the
applicable law (party autonomy)”).
165
See supra Part II.E.1 (discussing how New Jersey and California do not use the
“absent choice” provision).
166
Id.
167
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).
159
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show that, to the contrary, the forum state has the “most significant relationship” as required by section 188 for the determination of whose
168
In addition, states
law would apply absent the choice-of-law clause.
may be unwilling to boast that their own policy is “materially greater”
169
than a sister state’s in many cases.
With section 187(2) imposing
such a harsh standard on the plaintiff to invalidate the contractual
choice of law, courts must have an alternative means to decide if it is
unfair or inequitable to enforce the provision.
C. The Need for Change
While one of the purported goals of adopting a conflict of laws
170
regime is to avoid forum shopping, the application of section 187
actually encourages pre-dispute forum shopping in some contexts.
For instance, the most obvious scenario involves a contract of adhesion, with the stronger party providing a form contract to a weaker
171
party, containing terms that are more beneficial to it than the other
party. While courts have been willing to strike down clauses that
shock the conscience, pursuant to procedural and substantive uncon172
scionability principles, the party autonomy doctrine creates the notion that the underlying contract (and its individual clauses) are presumptively valid and instead subjects the choice-of-law clause “to the
complex ‘fundamental policy’ analysis found in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws . . . [which] may give such adhesive choice173
of-law clauses a presumption of greater validity than they deserve.”
The stronger party—instead of directly injecting clauses favorable to
it that might otherwise be unconscionable—can choose a forum to
174
which it has some relationship and whose law gives the effect of the

168

Id. § 188(1) (1971) (requiring that the forum with the most significant relationship govern contract issues) (emphasis added); id. § 188(2) (listing factors for
considering whether the forum is the state with the most significant relationship to
the transaction and the parties).
169
See, e.g., Estee Lauder Co. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(recognizing that mere contradiction of the forum state’s law does not render a fundamental policy “materially greater” for purposes of section 187).
170
Juenger, supra note 4, at 559.
171
Although weaker parties are normally individuals or consumers, they can also
be small businesses who have no real bargaining position against the larger companies with whom they contract. Thus, it seems that the current state of the law also
harms small businesses. See Woodward, supra note 6, at 64–69.
172
FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 301–02.
173
Woodward, supra note 6, at 51.
174
Although section 187 requires a “substantial relationship,” courts have interpreted that clause very broadly so that the word “substantial” becomes useless. See
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 670.
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favorable provision. The weaker party is not likely to realize the effect of the choice-of-law clause on its face, and will therefore be
bound to terms of which the party had no knowledge. Essentially, the
stronger party has great opportunity for pre-dispute forum shopping
through use of choice-of-law provisions.
Two of the most concrete examples of the egregious effects of
175
section 187 are Scheifley v. Discover Bank and Nexen Inc. v. Gulf Inter176
state Engineering Co., which are both discussed in Part II.E.2. Essentially, the plaintiffs in both cases were barred from receiving relief
177
due to the enforcement of the choice-of-law clause.
Additionally, there are numerous hypothetical examples that illustrate the egregious effects of section 187 especially those involving
class-action waivers. For example, if a large company that is incorpo178
rated in Delaware provides goods or services to consumers in Georgia and gets such consumers to sign adhesion contracts, the contract
may include a Delaware choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clause,
even if the company’s principal place of business and most of its con179
If the contract also contains an arbitration
sumers are in Georgia.
clause with an embedded class-action waiver, then a harmed consumer may have no access to relief. In Delaware, class-action waivers
180
are enforceable, whereas the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, applying Georgia law, recently ruled that arbitration
181
clauses with hidden class-action waivers are unconscionable.
If the
consumer attempts to bring a class-action against the corporation in
Georgia, her home state, where all of the transactions have occurred
and where the company maintains its principal place of business,
then the choice-of-law clause, with all the weight given to it by section
187, will require Georgia to apply Delaware law. The court’s attention will be drawn directly to the choice-of-law clause, which gives
presumptive validity to contractual issues, instead of focusing on the
unconscionability of the arbitration clause with the embedded class175

Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. June 25,
2004).
176
224 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App. 2006).
177
See supra Part II.E.2.
178
Most large publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware. Division
of Corporations, About Agency, State of Delaware Official Website, http://www.
corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
179
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing how a state of incorporation is sufficient to
meet the “substantial relationship” test in section 187).
180
See Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. June
25, 2004).
181
Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting, however,
that the question of unconscionability is to be determined on a case by case basis).
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action waiver. The court would have to conclude that nonenforcement of unconscionable terms is a fundamental policy of
Georgia, which is materially greater than the policy of enforcing
182
(purportedly) negotiated terms of a contract, and that Georgia law
would apply absent the Delaware choice-of-law clause. Most likely,
the court will uphold the choice-of-law clause because it is not
183
The
enough that a fundamental policy of the forum is thwarted.
court must also find that its fundamental policy is materially greater
than the fundamental policy of a sister state, which courts are hesi184
tant to find.
Another example of an egregious effect is allowing a stronger
party to an adhesion contract to choose the law of a state that has
shorter statute of limitations periods for relevant causes of action. By
merely agreeing to a choice of law by signing the form contract, the
weaker party is not likely to realize that all potential claims may be
barred by enforcement of the parties’ choice due to a shorter statute
of limitations period than the weaker party’s state, which is most likely to be the place in which most of the transactions occurred. The
trend is for states to uphold a choice-of-law clause, even if the claims
185
would be forever barred by the hidden statute of limitations.
D. Proposed Solutions
The current method for evaluating choice-of-law and choice-of186
While contract law tries to strike a balforum clauses is deficient.
187
ance between the freedom to contract and basic notions of fairness,
the stronger party to adhesion contracts can use the conflict of laws
system, specifically section 187, to avoid some of the fairness protection that contract law affords. This Comment proposes a new Restatement provision which focuses on the use of unconscionability for
directly evaluating the choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses as a
matter of contract law in the first instance. The forum state should
182

For the purposes of this hypothetical, this Comment assumes that the State of
Delaware considers this position a fundamental state policy.
183
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
184
See Estee Lauder Co. Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(recognizing that mere contradiction of the forum state’s law does not render a fundamental policy “materially greater” for purposes of section 187).
185
See, e.g., Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. Am. Med. Int’l., Inc., 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 33, 38–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Formato v. Protonex Tech. Corp., No.
050037C, 2006 WL 4114292, at *4 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Dec. 20, 2006).
186
See supra Parts II.B.1 and II.C.
187
This is evidenced by giving great power to parties to bargain for their terms,
but limiting that power by doctrines like duress, misrepresentation, undue influence,
and unconscionability.
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retain jurisdiction to decide the unconscionability issue by its own
law, so long as the forum state has a “substantial relationship” as de188
fined by previous case law.
1.

Allowing the Forum Court to Decide the
Unconscionability Issue if It Has a “Substantial
Relationship” to the Transaction or Parties

Presumably, the stronger party, who strong-armed the weaker
party into an adhesion contract, chose the choice of law or choice of
forum in the contract, knowing the chosen state has laws favorable to
it. To counteract this advantage, the forum court should apply its
own unconscionability law to the choice-of-law or choice-of-forum
clause, but only if the forum has a “substantial relationship” to the
transaction or parties according to the state’s case law defining “substantial relationship.” The plaintiff, especially if an individual consumer, will most likely bring the action in his or her home state,
where it is likely that the transaction or series of transactions occurred. Therefore, it is fair to let the forum use its own law for the initial unconscionability question if it is sufficiently related to the par189
ties or transaction.
This approach seems to resemble a minimum contacts analysis,
which is used to determine whether a defendant can be sued in a for190
eign state after having availed itself of the laws of that jurisdiction.
The theory would be that the defendant, although having sought to
contract into using only the laws of a designated state, has subjected
itself to the laws of the forum state (for our purposes, for just the initial unconscionability determination) by creating contacts with that
state by purposefully availing itself through transactions with resi191
dents of that state.
2.

Applying Unconscionability Directly to Choice-of-Law
and Forum Selection Clauses

The current system does not encourage a court to look specifically at the choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause in the first in-

188

See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 671; Woodward, supra note 6, at 27.
This is similar to the analysis for why it is acceptable to let a court uphold a
contractual choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause because the chosen state bears a
“substantial relationship” to the parties or transaction. See supra Part II.B.
190
See Adam M. Greenfield, Reviving the Distinction Between In Rem and In Personam
Jurisdiction by Way of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 29,
50 (2007).
191
Id.
189
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stance. The only initial question that pertains to the law of contracts
focuses on the fairness of the contract as a whole through the doc192
trines of misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and mistake.
Courts, therefore, must utilize Professor Woodward’s three-step analysis, and not until the third step does the court decide whether the
193
Once
choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause should be enforced.
at this third step, the court still must determine four things: (1)
whether the chosen law has either a “substantial relationship” to the
194
parties, or some other reasonable basis, (2) whether application of
the choice-of-law clause would be in contravention of the forum
195
state’s fundamental policy, (3) whether the forum state’s fundamental policy is materially greater than the policy of the state cho196
sen, and (4) whether the forum state’s law would govern absent the
197
choice by the parties. By the time the forum goes through the first
two steps, it still has to consider the four requirements in the third
step. This process limits the plaintiff’s ability to choose the forum.
By forcing the forum court to address the choice-of-law or
choice-of-forum clause at the outset (once a substantial relationship
has been established), the court can focus on the fairness of the situa198
tion without facing all the hurdles of the current system. Comment
b to section 187 already allows a court to strike down the whole contract due to misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or mis199
take, but the Restatement (Second) fails to realize that unconscionability is also an equitable doctrine meant to protect parties to a
200
contract from unfair practices. For the question of unconscionability, it would not be necessary to find that the forum court’s fundamental policy is “materially greater” than the law of the state chosen
by the parties. Removing the “materially greater” requirement would
not substantially diminish the power of the choice-of-law or forum selection clause because there are sufficient protections built into the
doctrine of unconscionability itself.

192

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971).
See supra Part III.A.
194
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).
195
Id. § 187(2)(b).
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
In addition to examining the clause itself by applying the doctrine of unconscionability, the court should still evaluate the contract as a whole by the doctrines of
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and mistake. See id. § 187 cmt. b.
199
Id.
200
See supra Part II.B.1.
193

CAMAROTE (FINAL)

2009]

4/6/2009 11:20:05 PM

COMMENT

631

The safeguards already embedded in the doctrine of unconscionability will both rid the unconscionability analysis of the unneeded “materially greater” test and ensure that the doctrine is not
overused. First, when an unconscionability claim is being decided,
the party who claims that the contract or term is unconscionable
201
bears the burden of proof . Second, most courts require a showing
of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, thus protecting
against a claim of unconscionability where the only objection is that
202
the contract was a contract of adhesion. Third, many courts are reluctant to use the doctrine of unconscionability in standard commer203
cial transactions because it lacks a clear definition.
These safeguards will protect against the overuse of the doctrine of
unconscionability while still ensuring that plaintiffs with valid claims
will benefit from the focused review of the choice-of-law or choice-offorum clause under the rubric of unconscionability. It will therefore
be unnecessary for the court to first determine if its law is “materially
greater” than the law of the chosen jurisdiction.
If the forum court finds that the choice-of-law or choice-offorum clause is unconscionable, then the forum court should apply
its own law. If the forum court finds the clause not to be unconscionable, then it can proceed by looking at other contract law devices such as misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and mistake
to see if the contract as a whole is valid, according to the law of the
chosen state. Once the court is satisfied that the contract is valid, it
should ensure that the chosen state has a substantial relationship to
the parties or transaction. The forum court should then further inquire about whether the choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause
should apply by analyzing whether applying the law of the chosen
state is in contravention of the forum state’s fundamental policy and
whether that fundamental policy is materially greater than the policy
of the chosen state. This analysis would no longer require that the
forum’s state law would govern absent the choice by the parties; this
approach balances out the lax standard for determining whether a
“substantial relationship” exists between the chosen state and the
transaction or parties. A further protection is that the forum court
can only hear the case in the first instance if it has proper jurisdiction

201

FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 299.
Id. at 301.
203
Nicola Lucchi, The Supremacy of Techno-Governance: Privatization of Digital Content
and Consumer Protection in the Globalized Information Society, 15 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH.
192, 221–22 (2007).
202
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over the defendant pursuant to the applicable rules of civil proce204
dure.
3.

Effects of the Proposed Provision

By allowing a forum court to apply its own law to the initial contracts question of unconscionability—and assuming a substantial relationship between the forum and the transaction or parties—the court
can help protect consumers and small business owners from the detrimental pre-dispute forum shopping efforts of the large company
who supplied the adhesion contract containing the choice-of-law or
choice-of-forum clause. Also, by letting the forum court decide this
initial question, the court is able to hold the defendant accountable
in the forum of which it has availed itself. Consumers will also be encouraged to bring actions in a convenient forum because travel expenses (incurred by traveling to the place of litigation) are better
born by the large company. However, this would not be too much of
a burden because the forum will only retain jurisdiction if the initial
“substantial relationship” test is met, and only for the question of unconscionability. Further, by forcing courts to ponder the existence of
a valid choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause in the first instance,
205
the presumption of a valid contract will be thwarted. Last, this new
provision will eliminate confusion from the current section 187 approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
The nearly universal acceptance of the party autonomy doctrine
has not only adversely affected weaker parties to contracts, but it has
also encouraged pre-dispute forum shopping. Section 187, although
deceptively short and seemingly clear, has caused much confusion in
courts because it is a clash between contracts and conflict of laws
principles. By giving deference to the parties’ contractual choices,
the rise of party autonomy seems to be a victory for contract law.
However, one key doctrine has not made its way into the conflicts
analysis from contracts law—the protective restraint on unfair
terms—unconscionability. If the conflict of laws regime continues to
give great deference to parties’ contractual rights and choices, then it
must also embrace and encourage the protection of unconscionabil204

See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–24 (1957) (requiring
that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state before the
forum court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
205
See Woodward, supra note 6, at 17 (suggesting that courts assume that an enforceable contract already exists when embarking on the conflicts of law analysis).
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ity as directly applied to choice-of-law and forum selection clauses,
which are increasingly used as vehicles for pre-dispute forum shopping. By forcing courts to look at the choice-of-law or forum selection clause as a threshold matter, courts will better protect weaker
parties to contracts of adhesion and ensure the fair review of contracts.

